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Dignity and Discrimination 
Frederick Mark Gedicks 
Delivered as the Dignity in Law Symposium keynote  
address, this essay surveys uses of “dignity” in U.S. 
constitutional law, with a focus on conflicts between the dignities 
attached to citizenship and religious conscience. Parts I and II 
discuss dignity as state sovereignty and hierarchical status. 
Part III examines the collision of dignities in the 
Masterpiece Cakeshop decision. Part IV argues that attention 
to the public or private nature of the site where religious 
accommodation is demanded clarifies when accommodation is 
appropriate, using a house of worship and a government office as 
illustrations. Part V lists other sites of accommodation and briefly 
discusses how one might use the public/private distinction despite 




   Guy Anderson Chair & Professor of Law, Brigham Young University Law School. 
This essay is based on a lecture given at the Law School on September 30, 2020, as part 
of the BYU Law Review’s Dignity in Law Symposium; it retains some of the informality with 
which it was delivered. I thank the editors of the Review for the opportunity to participate 
in the Symposium. I’m also grateful to Kif Augustine-Adams and my other faculty 
colleagues for comments and criticisms on earlier drafts, to BYU Law Research Librarian 
Iantha Haight for indispensable help in finding sources, and to Brickelle Bro, 
Mackenzie Knapp, Will Morrison, and Spencer Ostler for excellent research assistance. 
Errors that remain are mine. 
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 I have entitled my remarks today, “Dignity and Discrimination,” 
but I might also have titled them, “Dignities and Discrimination” 
or, even more precisely, “Which Dignity? . . . and Discrimination.” 
There are multiple conceptions of dignity at work in American 
constitutional law—the dignity of state sovereignty, the dignity 
attached to social status, the dignity wounded by insult, the 
dignity of religious conscience, the dignity of the free citizen. 
Which of these is at stake in discrimination cases, and how might 
we reconcile their conflicts? 
I. 
Among the earliest uses of “dignity” by the Supreme Court 
came in Chisholm v. Georgia, which held that a citizen of 
South Carolina could sue the state of Georgia in federal court for a 
debt the state refused to pay.1 The majority determined that he 
could, because the dignity of the people preempted the dignity of 
the states.2 After all, it reasoned, the states owe their very existence 
to “the People”; if the people are subject to federal diversity 
jurisdiction despite their weightier dignity, why should the states 
be excused? 3 
Outrage followed Chisholm, which was swiftly undone by the 
11th Amendment.4 With it vanished the priority of human dignity 
to state dignity in sovereign immunity doctrine. In fact, the Court 
has turned Chisholm inside-out: not only does the “dignity of the 
people” play no role in the contemporary doctrine, but the “dignity 
of the states” has crowded out most other competing 
considerations, including the very text of the 11th Amendment.5 
 
 1. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (opinions of Blair, Wilson & Cushing, 
JJ. & Jay, C.J., seriatim). 
 2. Id. at 455 (opinion of Wilson, J.). 
 3. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People, in Order to form a more perfect Union . . . .”); 
see Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 456 (opinion of Wilson, J.) (“If the dignity of each singly is 
undiminished” by defending a suit in federal court, then “the dignity of all jointly,” in the 
form of the state, “must be unimpaired.”) (emphasis added); id. at 470–71, 472 (opinion of 
Jay, C.J.) (In the United States, the People hold the “becoming dignity” of sovereignty, 
whereas their “rulers have none.”). 
 4. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 5. Compare id. (prohibiting extension of federal diversity jurisdiction to any lawsuit 
against a state), with Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding, inter alia, that the 11th 
Amendment exemplifies an unenumerated principle of state sovereign immunity that 
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The “preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity,” declared 
the Court in 2002, “is to accord States the dignity that is consistent 
with their status as sovereign entities.”6 It’s as if the states were 
medieval monarchies ruling their citizens as feudal subjects; 
sovereign immunity saves the states from the vulgar humiliation of 
answering to a mere citizen—even one of their own. 
II. 
The use of “dignity” to protect the prerogatives of state 
sovereignty is literally medieval. It recalls the vast array of 
privileges known as noble “dignities,” held by those of high birth 
or status during the Middle Ages.7 The notion of “dignitary” harm 
as personal insult descended from these medieval status 
hierarchies. “Dignity” signified a high, legally enforced status, 
while an “indignity” occurred when that status was violated 
or ignored.8 
While the United States has never enacted legal hierarchies 
based on rank or status,9 it has never hesitated to act out socio-racial 
ones. White Anglo-Saxon Protestants placed 19th-century Irish and 
Italian immigrants in a lower caste, if not a lower race,10 as they did 
20th century Jews.11 Legal discrimination against Chinese and 
Japanese immigrants was widespread; well into the 20th century, 
they were ineligible for naturalized citizenship and were prohibited 
 
precludes federal question jurisdiction in an action against a state, even when brought by 
one of its own citizens). 
 6. Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002) (emphasis 
added). Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 96–97 (1996), apparently disavowed this 
rationale, but it resurfaced almost immediately in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748–49 (1999). 
 7. See J.M. ROBERTS, PENGUIN HISTORY OF EUROPE 160 (1996); John Bell Henneman, 
Nobility, Privilege and Fiscal Politics in Late Medieval France, 13 FRENCH HIST. STUD. 1 (1983); Josiah 
C. Russell, The Triumph of Dignity over Order in England, 9 HISTORIAN 137, 146–47 (1947). 
 8. See Dignity, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, https://www-oed-com.proxlaw.byu.edu/ 
view/Entry/52653?redirectedFrom=dignity#eid (last visited Oct. 20, 2020); Indignity, 
OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, https://www-oed-com.proxlaw.byu.edu/view/Entry/ 
94500?redirectedFrom=indignity#eid (last visited Oct. 20, 2020). 
 9. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; id. § 10, cl. 1 (barring grants of “titles of nobility” 
by the federal government or the states). 
 10. See, e.g., United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923) (denying 
southeast Asian eligibility for citizenship, because he was not “the type of man” whom 
Congress “knew as white,” but including as white “the dark-eyed, swarthy people” of 
southern and eastern Europe). See generally Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of 
Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994). 
 11. See PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF THE JEWS 370, 449–60 (1987). 
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by California and the other coastal states from owning  
real property. 12 
Latter-day Saints were also subordinated in a racial hierarchy, 
despite their predominantly New England and Northern 
European heritage. Nineteenth-century Republicans racialized 
Mormons in their fight against polygamy, painting them as Asian 
or Middle Eastern tribal chieftains with harems and scores of 
children;13 this patriarchal rule was deemed incompatible with 
republican government.14 The irony is that 19th century law 
subordinated monogamously married women to their husbands, 
whom the law empowered to rule their households every bit as 
arbitrarily as the caricature of the Asian chieftain; this, too, was a 
status hierarchy. 
None of these groups was treated as badly as African 
Americans. Protections of slavery were written into the 
Constitution.15 Even after slavery’s abolition,16 Jim Crow 
subordinated African Americans by law in the South and in fact in 
the North, through segregated public schools, hotels, and 
restaurants; exclusion of African Americans from voting and jury 
service; racially restrictive covenants and segregated housing; 
 
 12. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Terrace v. Thompson, 
263 U.S. 197 (1923); Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922); Yamashita v. Hinkle, 
260 U.S. 199 (1922); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898); Chae Chan Ping v. 
United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); see also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 561 (1896) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (The Chinese constitute “a race so different from our own that we do 
not permit those belonging to it to become citizens of the United States. Persons belonging 
to it are, with few exceptions, absolutely excluded from our country.”). 
 13. Martha M. Ertman, Race Treason: The Untold Story of America’s Ban on Polygamy, 
19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 287 (2010); see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879) 
(“Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and western nations of Europe, 
and, until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost exclusively a feature of the 
life of Asiatic and of African people.”). 
 14. See, e.g., Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885) (discussing statute barring 
polygamists from holding office or voting): 
[C]ertainly no legislation can be supposed more wholesome and necessary in the 
founding of a free, self-governing commonwealth . . . than that which seeks to 
establish it on the basis of the idea of the family, as consisting in and springing 
from the union for life of one man and one woman in the holy estate of matrimony; 
the sure foundation of all that is stable and noble in our civilization. 
 15. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (providing that slaves count as 3/5ths of a person 
in congressional apportionment); id. § 9, cl. 1 (denying Congress power to prohibit 
importation of slaves for 20 years); id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (providing that fugitive slaves shall be 
returned to their owner upon the latter’s demand). 
 16. Id. amend. XIII. 
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anti-miscegenation laws; and intentional refusal by public 
authorities to protect African Americans from private violence 
against their persons and property.17 A customary code every bit as 
detailed as the medieval noble dignities enforced Black subjugation 
to White Supremacy, on pain of lynching and death.18 
These days, racial and sex-based status hierarchies are not 
written into law, and such private hierarchies are less common, 
though depressingly persistent. Still, American law now recognizes 
only one high rank, one preeminent caste, to which everyone 
belongs. As Jeremy Waldron has written, every person is “a 
Brahmin. Every man a duke. Every woman a queen.”19 Today we 
all equally enjoy the same high dignity. 
Or do we? 
III. 
Not quite ten years ago, Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins 
walked into a Denver bakery, Masterpiece Cakeshop, to order  
a wedding cake for their coming reception. But the owner, 
Jack Phillips, refused their order, because his conservative 
Christian beliefs forbade him from endorsing or participating in a 
same-sex marriage.20 
Now, it’s quite unclear that baking a cake for a wedding 
reception—even a unique, custom-designed cake of the sort 
Phillips baked—amounts to “endorsement” or “participation” in 
the marriage the reception celebrates. I’ve been to scores of 
wedding receptions, but never once has it occurred to me that the 
wedding cake signified the baker’s blessing of the marriage or 
participation in the ceremony. 
But we can set that aside. More salient is the collision of two 
dignities in this situation—Craig’s and Mullins’s dignity of 
citizenship, and Phillips’s dignity of religious conscience. 
 
 17. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 
(1883); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 
(1875). See generally ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 
1863–1877 (1988). 
 18. See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE 
L.J. 421 (1960). 
 19. JEREMY WALDRON, DIGNITY, RANK, AND RIGHTS 34 (Meir Dan-Cohen ed., 2015). 
 20. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724 (2018). 
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I do not doubt that Craig and Mullins suffered serious dignitary 
harm in the form of personal insult, nor do I discount the hurt they 
must have felt. Phillips essentially invoked the age-old insult, “I do 
not serve your kind.”21 What a slap in the face!—the precise act 
which once signaled an offense to dignity so grave that it could only 
be redressed by apology or duel. That the refusal was religiously 
sincere hardly softened the blow; delivered in the midst of the 
excitement of wedding plans, it turned “what should have been a 
happy occasion” into “a humiliating one.”22 
And yet, insult and humiliation seem off the mark. Protection 
of personal dignity is low on our list of constitutional priorities, 
which is why Americans with any public standing find it nearly 
impossible to win a defamation suit.23 A legal doctrine of personal 
insult would be similarly problematic. Is the measure subjective or 
objective? Is dignity violated if the plaintiff sincerely feels insulted, 
like a dignitary “thin-skull” rule, or must the feeling be 
“reasonable,” in the sense that the “average ordinary person” 
would have been insulted? The history of negligence in tort teaches 
that “average person” standards are fraught with bias. It took 
revolutions in racial and sexual equality before white American 
males would concede that their perspectives and experiences were 
not shared by women and people of color. Asking overwhelmingly 
straight judges and juries to decide which refusals of service are 
insulting (or not) to the “average ordinary LGBTQ person” is not a 
development to hope for. 
Most importantly, insult or humiliation is not the only target at 
which antidiscrimination laws are aimed, and perhaps not even the 
 
 21. See Louise Melling, Religious Refusals to Public Accommodations Laws: Four Reasons 
to Say No, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 177, 190, 192 (2015). Phillips’s precise words were a matter 
of dispute, but the parties agreed that he unambiguously refused to bake a custom-designed 
cake for any celebration of any same-sex union, for reasons of religious conscience. 
 22. Brief for Respondents Charlie Craig & Dave Mullins at 1, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 
Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111); see also 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, 
WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 141 (2014) (The pervasive humiliations 
heaped on African Americans in the Jim Crow South left them with a “degenerating sense 
of ‘nobodiness.’”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.); 
Melling, supra note 21, at 189 (“At their core,” religious accommodations from 
anti-discrimination laws “produce a dignitary harm for the person who is turned away.”). 
 23. See, e.g., Hustler Mag. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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principal one. When Pope Francis condemns the death penalty as 
an attack on human dignity,24 it is not because execution is 
humiliating; rather, it’s because execution disrespects the 
condemned as a person, violating his dignity.25 State-sponsored 
execution implies that we ourselves are God, empowered to render 
justice we do not understand by taking life we did not create, using 
another person for revenge or deterrence.26 Executions might 
humiliate or insult the condemned, but these are secondary to the 
violation of his humanity. 
Refusals of service based on race, sex, religion, sexual 
orientation, or gender identity do not only offend one’s personal 
dignity, but also her dignity of citizenship. We commonly think of 
rights of citizenship as entitlements to political and governmental 
participation—the rights to vote, to serve on juries, to serve in 
government office. I am using “citizenship” in a broader, less 
technical sense. Waldron points out that political philosophers 
often use “citizen” to refer to any resident properly subject to a 
country’s authority. “[C]itizenship connotes not only the rights, 
powers, and responsibilities of a privileged class but also the 
general quality of relationship between the state and those subject 
to its power.”27 
This broader understanding of citizenship overlaps with the 
sense of “citizenship” held by Republicans in the 39th Congress, 
 
 24. E.g., Pope Francis, Address to Participants in the Meeting Promoted by the 
Pontifical Council for Promoting the New Evangelization (Vatican City, Oct. 11, 2017), 
http://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2017/october/documents/papa
-francesco_20171011_convegno-nuova-evangelizzazione.html; see, e.g., Elizabetta Povoledo 
& Laurie Goodstein, Pope Francis Declares Death Penalty Always Wrong, N.Y. TIMES,  
Aug. 3, 2018 (§ A), at 1, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/02/world/europe/pope-
death-penalty.html. 
 25. See Pope Francis, supra note 24 (“[T]he death penalty is an inhumane measure 
that . . . abases human dignity.”); Povoledo & Goodstein, supra note 24, at 1 (“‘[E]very life is 
sacred, every human person is endowed with an inalienable dignity . . . .’”) (quoting Francis). 
 26. See Pope Francis, supra note 24 (The death penalty “is per se contrary to the Gospel, 
because it entails the willful suppression of a human life . . . of which—ultimately— 
only God is the true judge and guarantor.”); Povoledo & Goodstein, supra note 24, at 1 
(“[C]apital punishment ‘does not render justice to the victims, but rather fosters 
vengeance.’”) (quoting Francis). 
 27. Jeremy Waldron, Citizenship and Dignity, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY 327, 
335 (Christopher McCrudden ed., 2013); see also id. (“Most constitutional rights and other 
legal protections enjoyed by those who are, in the technical sense, citizens of a given polity 
are likely to be enjoyed by noncitizens too.”); U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1 (guaranteeing 
due process and equal protection rights to “any person”). 
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which drafted the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
14th Amendment.28 Moderate Republicans affirmatively denied 
that the unspecified “privileges” and “immunities” of “citizens” 
included rights of political participation; they insisted these 
referred to common law “civil rights,” like the rights to make and 
enforce contracts, to access the courts, and to acquire, hold, and 
dispose of real and personal property.29 Radical Republicans went 
much further, arguing not only for inclusion of civil and political 
rights, but also for those rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights, 
which then applied only to the federal government, and even for a 
range of unenumerated natural and customary rights.30 
The Supreme Court’s Reconstruction-era decisions eviscerated 
any possibility that the Privileges or Immunities Clause might 
meaningfully shelter individual rights.31 In the course of time, 
however, the Court deployed the Due Process Clause to apply 
virtually all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights against the states, 
and to constitutionalize numerous unenumerated rights, including 
rights to control the education and upbringing of one’s children,32 
to live in extended family units,33 to marry the person of one’s 
choice,34 and to shield private sexual acts and reproductive choices 
from state scrutiny.35 
 
 28. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .”); see also id. 
art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities 
of Citizens in the several States.”). 
 29. See PAUL BREST, SANFORD LEVINSON, JACK M. BALKIN, AKHIL REED AMAR & 
REVA B. SIEGEL, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 332–35 (7th ed. 2018) 
(discussing drafting and enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1866). 
Most Republicans in the 39th Congress understood that one purpose of the 
14th Amendment was to place the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 on firmer 
constitutional footing than was provided by the Enforcement Clause of the 
13th Amendment. See id. at 335–36; WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: 
FROM JUDICIAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 47–48 (1988). 
 30. See BREST ET AL., supra note 29, at 336–45; NELSON, supra note 29, at 52. 
 31. See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); Slaughter-House Cases, 
83 U.S. 36 (1873); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873). 
 32. E.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 33. E.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
 34. E.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015); Loving v. Virginia, 338 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 35. E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479 (1965); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (statute prohibiting 
1.GEDICKS_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE) 3/28/2021  12:55 AM 
969 Dignity and Discrimination 
 969 
 
There are, therefore, philosophical, originalist, and doctrinal 
justifications for thinking about the rights and privileges of 
“citizenship” in broader terms than political participation. One 
such privilege is the right to freely circulate in public commercial 
markets to fulfill one’s legitimate wants and needs. Whether 
citizens or not, Americans take for granted that they may enter  
any commercial establishment open to the public to purchase  
goods and services. (At least, straight white Americans take this 
for granted.) This expectation is reinforced by federal and state 
antidiscrimination statutes and was part of the common law before 
it was infected with Jim Crow.36 People should not have to 
undertake “accommodations reconnaissance” to determine 
whether a business will serve them. “Unless and until the 
government disallows that kind of discrimination, the risk of 
unequal citizenship remains real.”37 The right to circulate freely  
in public commercial markets is one of the dignities of citizenship,  
and its denial an indignity. As Justice Kennedy wrote in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 
Our society has come to the recognition that gay persons and gay 
couples cannot be treated as social outcasts or as inferior in 
dignity and worth. [I]t is a general rule that [religious] objections 
do not allow business owners and other actors in the economy 
and in society to deny protected persons equal access to goods 
and services under a neutral and generally applicable public 
accommodations law.38  
 
distribution of contraceptives to single persons for prevention of pregnancy but not for 
prevention of disease violated Equal Protection Clause of 14th Amendment). 
 36. E.g., Title II, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (2016).  
See generally Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private 
Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283 (1996) (documenting how the common law developed a right 
to exclude customers from retail businesses in response to the racial equality that emerged 
during Reconstruction). 
 37. NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS EGALITARIANISM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE 35 (2017). 
 38. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727 (2018); see 
also Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984) (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United 
States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964)) (The “‘deprivation of personal dignity’” effected by ‘“denials 
of equal access to public establishments’” is both a “stigmatizing injury” and a “denial of 
equal opportunity.”). 
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But the dignity of citizenship was only half the story of 
Masterpiece Cakeshop. Against the dignity of citizenship, Phillips 
raised the dignity of religious conscience. Rights of religious 
conscience have a long rhetorical history in the United States. The 
founding era is filled with references to the “sacred” rights of 
conscience, perhaps most famously in James Madison’s Memorial 
and Remonstrance against the Virginia Assessment Bill: 
[W]e hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth, “that 
Religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the manner 
of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, 
not by force or violence.” The Religion then of every man must be 
left to the conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the 
right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate.39 
Constitutional care for the dignity of religious conscience is 
evident in the 1st Amendment’s guarantee of religious free exercise 
and prohibition of religious establishments,40 as well as in 
Article VI’s proscription of religious tests for federal office.41 These 
protections were eventually applied to the states as well.42 Phillips 
prevailed in Masterpiece Cakeshop precisely because the Court 
thought the state had failed to treat his claim of religious conscience 
with the dignity the Constitution demanded.43 
Still, the United States has never protected religious conscience 
to the nearly absolute degree implied by Madison and the 
constitutional text. Current law allows the state to impose 
incidental burdens on religious exercise in pursuit of its legitimate 
 
 39. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments para. 1 
(June 20, 1785) (quoting VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. XIV). 
 40. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”). 
 41. Id. art. VI, cl. 3. 
 42. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 
(1947); cf. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (state test for position of public trust held 
invalid under Establishment Clause). 
 43. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729, 1731 (“The neutral and respectful 
consideration to which Phillips was entitled was compromised here. . . . [T]he Commission’s 
treatment of Phillips’ case violated the State’s duty under the First Amendment not to base 
laws or regulations on hostility to a religion or religious viewpoint.”). Though the Court here 
seems clearly to recognize a dignitary concept, it continues its pattern of recognizing 
dignitary harms from racial and other kinds of invidious discrimination, but not in analyzing 
free exercise rights. 
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goals,44 so long as it does not single out religion for burdens not 
imposed on similarly situated secular activities.45 The free exercise 
of religion is a constitutional right, to be sure, but it’s an equality 
right, not a liberty right. Congress and many states have enacted 
“religious liberty statutes” which mandate heightened scrutiny of 
even incidental burdens on religion, but even these permit state 
interests to violate the dignity of religious conscience for weighty 
goals that cannot otherwise be achieved.46   
IV. 
The key to resolving conflicts between dignity of religious 
conscience and dignity of citizenship lies in the place or site where 
these dignities collide.47 Dignity of citizenship and dignity of 
conscience are inversely related through the public or private 
character of the site where they assert themselves.48 Dignity of 
 
 44. Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 45. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
The Court’s free exercise doctrine is in flux on this point, at least as regards 
applications for emergency relief from COVID-related restrictions on worship and other 
religious activities. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, The U.S. Supreme Court and Pandemic 
Restrictions on Religious Worship, TALK ABOUT: LAW & RELIGION (Dec. 9, 2020), 
https://talkabout.iclrs.org/2020/12/09/the-u-s-supreme-court-and-pandemic-restrictions/. 
Compare S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613 (2020) (Roberts, 
C.J., concurring in denial of application for injunctive relief) (arguing that courts should defer 
to pandemic restrictions on worship so long as “[s] imilar or more severe restrictions apply 
to comparable secular gatherings”), with Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo,  
141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) (applying strict scrutiny to highly restrictive pandemic limitation  
on worship). 
 46. E.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb;  
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc;  
see, e.g., Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzalez: A Look at State RFRAs,  
55 S.D. L. REV. 466 (2010). 
 47. Cf. ONORA O’NEILL, CONSTRUCTIONS OF REASON: EXPLORATIONS OF KANT’S 
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 90 (1989) (apparently inconsistent moral actions can be made 
coherent by considering the different places or contexts in which they occur). 
 48. I have discussed the importance of the public or private character of the site of 
accommodation in Frederick Mark Gedicks, Public, Private, Religious? Religious Freedom 
Restoration Acts in the U.S. States, 3 QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI 772 (2015); Frederick Mark 
Gedicks, Panel Presentation and Discussion at the Claremont Graduate University 
Conference on Religious Liberty in the 21st Century: The Odd Couple: Freedom from 
Religion and Religious Group Rights (Mar. 25, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=qBA5kJym7Qo&list=PLhqg559k1eTvNNNaJLVUL9-LNTt_SfLQ-&index=41&t=0s; 
Frederick Mark Gedicks, Chautauqua Institution Interfaith Lecture Series: Three Problems 
of Pluralism in Masterpiece Cakeshop (Aug. 9, 2018), https://online.chq.org/ 
ci/sessions/11503/view; and Frederick Mark Gedicks, Discussion at the Centro per le 
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conscience is more at home, and makes a more powerful claim for 
recognition, the more private the site of accommodation. Dignity of 
citizenship is the opposite—the more public the site, the more 
powerful its claim. Consider how these dignities interact in a 
religious congregation and a government office. 
A. 
A “house of worship” is quintessentially private space. Chapels 
and cathedrals were once literal sanctuaries beyond royal 
jurisdiction; a person who grasped the altar, even a felon, could not 
be touched by the King or his agents.49 The tradition of sanctuary 
persists to this day, most commonly in undocumented aliens who 
lodge in a church to forestall deportation; though nothing legally 
prohibits it, law enforcement is normally loath to invade a church 
except in the most serious circumstances.50 
Religious congregations enjoy absolute immunity from liability 
under antidiscrimination laws when they hire or fire their leaders 
and others who teach the congregation’s doctrine or exemplify  
its practices.51 They may welcome or cast out members on any  
basis they please,52 and the state is categorically prohibited from 
using theology to decide conflicts among their members or 
 
Scienze Religiose, Fondazione Bruno Kessler: Dignity and Discrimination: Religious 
Accommodation, Antidiscrimination Laws, and Reproductive Rights in the United States 
(and Europe) (Nov. 4, 2019); see also Elder Lance B. Wickman, Address at the 2016 Brigham 
Young University Religious Freedom Conference: Promoting Religious Freedom in a Secular 
Age: Fundamental Principles, Practical Priorities, and Fairness for All (July 7, 2016), 
https://newsroom.churchofjesuschrist.org/article/promoting-religious-freedom-secular-
age-fundamental-principles-practical-priorities-fairness-for-all (discussing religious 
accommodations in terms of the public/private distinction). 
 49. See J.H. Baker, The English Law of Sanctuary, 2 ECCLESIASTICAL L.J. 8 (1990). 
 50. See, e.g., Paighten Harkins, Mariah Noble & Bob Mims, Utah Woman Who Has 
‘Exhausted Her Appeals’ Will Try to Revive Her Case in Immigration Court — from the Sanctuary 
of a Salt Lake City Church, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.sltrib.com/news/ 
politics/2018/01/31/mother-seeks-sanctuary-at-utah-church-rather-than-boarding-plane-
for-deportation-to-honduras/. 
 51. E.g., Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020); 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, 
565 U.S. 171 (2012); Serbian E. Orthodox Church v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976). 
 52. Cf. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (statutory exemption of church’s commercial nonprofit business 
from Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not violate Establishment Clause). 
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with outsiders.53 Members are free to worship and express 
themselves within the congregation however they wish, so long as 
they do not violate the criminal law or infringe upon the rights of 
unconsenting others. Citizen rights of service or participation are 
inapplicable, if not wholly irrelevant, in this private religious space. 
B. 
Now contrast the religious congregation with a government 
office. A county clerk’s office, for example, is where one may vote, 
register a vehicle, record property deeds and transfers, pay state 
and local taxes, obtain a marriage license, and otherwise conduct 
business with the government; county officials might also be 
empowered to solemnize marriages. All this work is administered 
by an elected or appointed government official, the county clerk, 
who is authorized to act in the name of the county government. 
So a county clerk’s office is public in two senses: it is a physical 
location that members of the public have a right to enter to transact 
business with the government, and it is a government position 
filled by an agent of the people who is obligated to serve them.  
It is hard to imagine physical or conceptual space that is more 
public, and thus where the dignity of citizenship makes more 
powerful claims. 
When a county clerk refuses to issue a marriage license to a 
same-sex couple for reasons of religious conscience, her claim is 
weak.54 Her personal dignity of conscience cannot override the 
dignity of citizenship in such a quintessentially public space. Even 
if the state is willing to accommodate her claim, it ought not to; no 
government official should be afforded the power to unilaterally 
 
 53. E.g., Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l 
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 
(1952) (constitutionalizing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871)). 
 54. Cf. Miller v. Davis, No. 15-5880, slip op. at 2, 2015 WL 10692640, at *1 (6th Cir. Aug. 
26, 2015) (“[I]t cannot be defensibly argued that the holder of the Rowan County Clerk’s 
office . . . may decline to act in conformity with the United States Constitution as interpreted 
by a dispositive holding of the United States Supreme Court.”), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 23 
(2015). See generally Alan Blinder & Richard Pérez-Peña, Kentucky Clerk Denies Same-Sex  
Marriage Licenses, Defying Court, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2015 (§ A), at 1, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/02/us/same-sex-marriage-kentucky-kim-davis.html. 
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excuse herself from the duties of her office.55 Government offices 
exist to serve all the people. The officials who fill and administer 
them are elected by the people or appointed by someone who is. 
They take an oath to discharge their offices fairly and without 
discriminating.56 Their compensation is funded from taxes assessed 
on all the people. It is, therefore, an indignity, a violation of the 
dignity of citizenship, for a clerk to deny service to any of the 
people she is pledged to serve. It matters not that the same service 
is available in the next county over, or from a subordinate official 
or employee in the clerk’s own office. Citizens are entitled to public 
service from those they elect to carry it out; those who occupy and 
administer the power of such offices may not pick or choose which 
of the people they will serve,57 even for so weighty a reason as 
religious conscience. As Justice Scalia once suggested, a 
government official whose religious conscience prevents her from 
performing the duties of her office must resign.58 
V. 
These are “easy cases” because they represent the two poles of 
the public/private continuum, where one or the other 
uncontroversially predominates. The public or private character of 
other sites where dignities commonly conflict is less clear—
religious nonprofit businesses and activities, retail commercial 
businesses, housing and employment, and participation in 
government contracts and funding programs are areas where 
dignity conflicts are common. Mutually satisfactory agreements 
 
 55. Cf. Ermold v. Davis, 936 F.3d 429, 437 (6th Cir. 2019) (Obergefell “said nothing to 
suggest that government officials may flout the Constitution by enacting religious-based 
policies to accommodate their own religious beliefs.”), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 3 (2020). 
 56. Some clerks swear an oath to discharge their duties “without favor, affection or 
partiality.” See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30A.020 (West 1978). Others swear to uphold “the 
Constitution,” see, e.g., UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 10, which would include Equal Protection 
Clause prohibitions on invidious discrimination, see, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) 
(sexual orientation); Loving v. Virginia, 338 U.S. 1 (1967) (race). 
 57. Cf. Ermold, 936 F.3d at 436 (“[N]owhere in the Constitution—or in constitutional 
law, for that matter—does it say that a government official may infringe constitutional rights 
so long as another official might not have. All government officials must respect all 
constitutional rights.”). 
 58. Lisa Miller, Justice Scalia Speaks for Himself on Death Penalty, Not the  
Catholic Church, WASH. POST (Oct. 27, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/ 
on-faith/justice-scalia-speaks-for-himself-on-death-penalty-not-the-catholic-church/2011/ 
10/26/gIQAXkueLM_story.html. 
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resolving conflicts at these sites are difficult to achieve because of 
their zero-sum quality—every concession to the dignity of the other 
side comes at the expense of one’s own.59 
The public-private distinction is itself controversial. 
Anti-foundationalists argue that it’s illusory, that purportedly 
“private” activities or locations can be plausibly recharacterized as 
“public,” and vice-versa.60 Nevertheless, liberal democratic theory 
has long rested the meaningful protection of human rights on some 
boundary between locations controlled by idiosyncratic values 
presumed beyond government regulation (the private) and 
activities and locations where government is properly present and 
shared values presumptively predominate (the public).61 It is 
difficult to imagine a free society in which every aspect of life is 
public, and equally difficult to imagine an orderly society in which 
every aspect of life is up for private grabs. The “ordered liberty” 
safeguarded by liberal democracy requires a zone for each of the 
public and the private.62 
Of course, the boundary between the public and the private 
does not correspond to any naturally existing feature of the 
physical world; it is largely, if not entirely, a socio-political 
construct.63 The boundary moves back and forth in response to 
contingent cultural, economic, legal, political, and social forces.64 
Activities and locations once thought indisputably private, like 
 
 59. Cf. J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2336 (1997) (arguing 
that antidiscrimination laws are “understood as a sign of increased social status” for LGBTQ 
persons obtained “at the expense of heterosexuals”—i.e., “homosexuals are being given 
something new that is being taken away from heterosexuals”). 
 60. See, e.g., MARIANO CROCE & ANDREA SALVATORE, UNDOING TIES: POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY AT THE WANING OF THE STATE  78–79 (Engl. Trans. 2015). 
The literature on the socially constructed character of “public” and “private” is 
extensive. The locus classicus is Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question (1843), in 3 KARL MARX & 
FREDERICK ENGELS, COLLECTED WORKS 146 (Int’l Publishers 1975). For a balanced and 
succinct analysis, see Larry Alexander, The Public/Private Distinction and Constitutional Limits 
on Private Power, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 361 (1993). 
 61. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil 
Government (1690), in TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING 
TOLERATION 3, 89–94 (Charles L. Sherman ed., 1965). 
 62. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324–25 (1937). 
 63. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. REV. 671,  
680–81 (1992); see also Alexander, supra note 60, at 371 (“We perceive matters as appropriately 
assigned to one or the other of these domains in part because we are socially constructed to 
do so.”). 
 64. See, e.g., IAN HACKING, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHAT? 6–7, 12 (1999). 
1.GEDICKS_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE) 3/28/2021  12:55 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 46:4 (2021) 
976 
 
“the home,” where government has no place or power, are now 
proper areas of government regulation, to punish, for example, 
child abuse and marital rape.65 Other matters once thought 
uncontroversially public, like restrictions on marriage, use of 
contraceptives, and access to abortion, are now substantially 
insulated from government regulation and scrutiny by the 
constitutional right to privacy.66 
Nevertheless, the social contingency of the public-private 
boundary does not make its location random or unpredictable. At 
any given time, one can make reasonable judgments about social 
expectations regarding the public or private character of a site of 
dignity conflicts, informed by judicial decisions, enacted statutes, 
public political discussions, and practical experience which  shape 
and illuminate such expectations.67 Perhaps the most important 
factor in setting the public/private boundary is the potential to 
interfere with the rights or legitimate interests of others;  
it is difficult to argue that an activity is “private” when it harms 
other people. The Court itself has tended to protect religious 
conscience in contexts that do not involve material harms or costs 
 
 65. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminism and Family Law, 33 FAM. L.Q. 475, 494–95 
(1999) (“Traditionally, the law has viewed violence in the family as a private issue, into which 
the law should not intrude . . . . Feminists have shown that, to the extent family violence is 
beyond the reach of the law, men’s abuse of and power over women is enabled and 
affirmed.”). Compare id. at 495 (describing abrogation or qualification of the common law 
immunity for spousal rape as a welcome step against domestic violence), with MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 213.1 cmt. 8(c) (1980) (defending retention of the spousal rape immunity as a 
guarantee of marital privacy). 
 66. E.g., June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020) (access to abortion); 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (access to marriage by same-sex couples); Planned 
Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (access to abortion); Loving v. Virginia, 
338 U.S. 1 (1967) (access to marriage by interracial couples); Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (use of contraception). 
 67. See, e.g. TEBBE, supra note 37, at 33–35 (applying Rawls’s “reflective equilibrium” 
to determine when a religious accommodation from an anti-discrimination law is 
appropriate); cf. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 338–39 (Joel Weinsheimer & 
Donald G. Marshall rev. trans., 2013): 
[T]he judge’s judgment does not proceed from an arbitrary and unpredictable 
decision, but from the just weighing up of the whole. Anyone who has immersed 
himself in the particular situation is capable of undertaking this just weighing-up. 
This is why in a state governed by law, there is legal certainty—i.e., it is in principle 
possible to know what the exact situation is. 
Id.; see also JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 8 (1996) (Reflection on “the shared fund of 
implicitly recognized basic ideas and principles” of “public culture” helps to identify 
institutions suited to securing liberal democratic values.). 
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to others.68 These judgments of public and private can resolve 
conflicts of dignities, as they do with religious congregations and 
government offices. 
* * * 
Nearly a century ago, our own Justice Sutherland—raised just 
down the road in Springville, and still the only Utahn to serve on 
the Supreme Court—surprised his libertarian brethren by writing 
what remains the leading opinion on zoning under the Due Process 
Clause. Defending zoning as the statutory analog to the common 
law of nuisance, Sutherland explained that “[a] nuisance may 
merely be a right thing in a wrong place,—like a pig in the  parlor 
instead of the barnyard.”69 
Dignity of citizenship and dignity of religious conscience are 
both “right things” worth defending—but not everywhere. It is no 
denigration of either the dignity of the citizen or the dignity of 
conscience to require that their conflicts be mediated by deciding 




 68. See, e.g., Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (2015); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 
573 U.S. 682 (2014); cf. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (declaring statute 
exempting commercial employees from working on their Sabbath unconstitutional because 
of burden imposed on employers and other employees). See generally Frederick Mark 
Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate:  
An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 343 (2014); 
Frederick Mark Gedicks & Andrew Koppelman, Invisible Women: Why an Exemption for Hobby 
Lobby Would Violate the Establishment Clause, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 51 (2014);  
Micah Schwartzman, Nelson Tebbe & Richard Schragger, The Costs of Conscience,  
106 KY. L.J. 781 (2017). 
The statutory exemption from mandatory military service, afforded to religious, but 
not secular, pacifists, is not to the contrary. Notwithstanding its textual restriction to 
religious belief, the Court extended the exemption to nonreligious pacifists to avoid an 
Establishment Clause violation. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). Justice 
Harlan would have declared the exemption unconstitutional as written. Id. at 356–61 
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that a draft exemption statute which accommodates 
religious but not secular pacifists is an unconstitutional religious preference). See generally 
William P. Marshall, Third-Party Burdens and Conscientious Objection to War, 106 KY. L.J. 685 
(2017) (suggesting that the religious draft exemption is historically and doctrinally sui generis 
and inapplicable beyond situations involving mandatory military service). 
 69. Vill. of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). 
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